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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the impact of the Medicaid patient subsidy and
Certificate of Need (CON) cost containment programs on nursing home behavior.
The analysis is complicated by the fact the both proprietary and'not for
profit" nursing homes exist, and by the problem that qualityis not directly
,Juvi
Medicaidpays the for the care of the financially indigent by directly
reimbursing nursing homes at a predetermined rate. As a result, nursinghomes
can price discriminate between patients who finance their care privatelyand
patients whose care is financed by Medicaid. Nevertheless, nursinghomes are
required to provide the same quality to both types of patients. Typically,
Medicaid reimbursement rates are set by a cost plus method, where the
reimbursement per patient is equal to average cost plus some return referred
to as the Medicaid "plus" factor. Our results show that Medicaid policymakers
face a trade—off between quality and the access of poor to nursing home care.
Specifically, we find that increases in the Medicaid plus"factor cause
nursing homes to reduce quality and substitute Medicaid patientsfor "private
pay" patients. These quality differences can be quite large.In fact, in our
sample, we find that homes who receive high Medicaid "plus'factors provide
hundreds of thousands of dollars less in goods and services than homeswho
receive average Medicaid "plus" factors, certris paribus.
CON attempts to control nursing home expenditures by limiting the supply
of beds with capacity constraints and entry barriers. Our analysisshows that
CON policy makers are forced to trade off containing the size of the industry
(and therefore total Medicaid payments) against quality and accessof the poor
to nursing home care. Specifically, we find that the capacity constraintsand
the reduced competition from the entry barriers lead to lower qualityand
fewer Medicaid patients receiving care.
Paul J. Gertler
Department of Economics
State University of New York
Stony Brook, NY 117941. INTRODUCTION
In the nursing home inoustry, government reaulators are concerned witn
assuring a high stanoord of quality, providing the poor with access to care,
and controlirg the expansion of the industry. To this end, the government has
created the Medicaid (and Medicare) patient subsidy programs and the
Certificate of Need (CON) cost containment program. This paper theoretically
and empirically analyzes the impact of Medicaid and CON policy on nursing home
behavior. The theoretical analysis is complicated by the fact that 00th
proprietary and not for profit nursing homes exist, and the empirical work
is complicated ty the problem that quality is not airectly observed.
Medicaid pays the for the care of the financially indigent by directly
reimbursina nursing homes at a predetermined rate. As a result, nursing homes
can price discriminate between patients who finance their care privately ano
patients whose care is financed by Medicaid. Nevertheless, nursing homes are
requirea to provide the same quality to both types of patients, where quality
is definea by the package of goods and services providea by the nursing home.
Quality is determined by the private pay" market. The greater "private pay"
demano relative to Medicaid, the higher is quality. If the 'private pay"
market did not exist, then nursing homes would face only Meaicaid demand,
which is insensitive to quality, ana therefore, would have no incentive to
proviae more quality than is necessary to obtain government certification.
Typically, Medicaia reimbursement rates are set by a cost plus methoc.
where the reimbursement per patient is equal to average cost plus some return
referred to as the Medicaid "plus" factor. Our results show that Medicaia
policy makers face a quality—access trade—off. Specifically, we find that
increases in the Medicaid "plus" factor cause nursing homes to reduce quality
and substitute Medicaid patients for "private pay" patients. The increase in
the "plus" factor raises the marginal profit of a Medicaid patient. Therefore,
homes have incentive to substitue Medicaid patients for "private pay"
patients. Homes reduce "private pay" demand and operating costs by lowering
quality. These quality differences can be quite large. Specifically, in our
sample, we find that homes who recieve high Medicaid "plus" factors provide
hundreds of thousands of aollars less in goods and services than homes who
recieve averaa€ Medicaid 'pius" tactors, certris paribus.2
CONattempts to control nursing home expenditures y limiting the suoply
of beas with capacity constraints ara entry barriers. CON policy makers are
forcea to traoe off containing the size of the industry randthereforetotal
Medicaid payments) against quality and access. Specifically, we fina that the
capacity constraints and the reduced competition from the entry barriers lead
to lower quality and fewer Medicaid patients receiving care.
The theoretical analysis is based on Gertler (1985a) and (1985b)) The
model is based on the notion that there are quantity and quality aspects to
production, ana both quantity and quality are endogerous.2 Specifically.
nursing homes produce a series of commodities, such as medical care, room anc
board, ana social activities. The quality of nursing home care is the utility
patients derive from consuming this package. Nursing home output, then, is
characterized by the total number at patients and average quality. Proprietary
homes are assumed to maximize profits by choosing quality and "private pay
price which aetermines the mix of "private pay" and Medicaid patients)
subject to the CON capacity constraint. Not for profit' homes are specified
as utility maximizers subject to CON capacity and break even constraints.
The empirical analysis estimates a linear specification of the reduced
form, but is complicated Decause quality is not directly observed. Instead of
directly estimating the reduced torm quality equation, we use the theory of
production to specify a model in which quality is a latent variable, but the
parameters of the reoucea form quality equation are identified. The model has
a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMiC) interpretation, where the
indicators are conditional input demanas which have been filtered to remove
all sources of variation except quality and random disturbances.3
We discuss the regulatory enviornment in section II, the theoretical
model in section III, the empirical specification section IV, the data in
section V, the empirical results jr section V, and summarizes in section VI.
II. THE NURSING HOME INDUSTRY
The nursing home industry has expanded from approximately $190 million in
1950 to over $18 billion in 198O. Most of the expansion took place after
1966, the year in which the Medicaid program began. As of 1980, the public
share of nursing home expenditures was over 65%. Health care regulators have
the task of trying to control this expansion, while simultaneously providing
the poor with access to nursing home care and promoting a high standard of
quality. The major forms of government intervention are the Medicaid patient
subsidy program and the CON cost containment program.3
Medicaid Is an entitlement program established under the Social Security
Act to provide the poor with a minimum floor of health services. Through
direct subsidies, the Medicaid program makes health care available to
incividuals who otherwise could not afford it. It is jointly financed y State
ana Federal governments, but administered on a State basis. Tne Medicaio
program reimburses nursing homes a set fee for the care of Medicaid patients.
Typically, States pay nursing homes via "cost plus" reimbursement, although a
few States have opted for a prospectively set flat reimbursement rate.
The CON cost containment program was passed into law in response to the
rapid growth of the health care industry during the late 1960's and early
1970's. It requires that, in order to expand an existing nursing home or build
a new one, the government must certify that the proposed facility is indeed
"needed. Effectively, CON limits the existing capacity of existing nursing
homes and new entry into the market.5 It was thought that the expansion could
be contained by limiting the available supply of nursing home beds.
In essence, government regulation has turned nursing homes into price
discriminators. The Medicaid program creates a second market for nursing home
care, and CON restricts supply so that there is excess Medicaid patient
demand. Therefore, Medicaid demand is perfectly elastic at the Medicaid
reimbursement rate. The excess Medicaid demand hypothesis is supported
empirically in Scanlon (1980).6 Hence, nursing homes compete with each other
for 'private pay' patients knowing that they can always admit Meoicaid
patients at the Medicaid reimOursement rate if they have excess capacity.
III. A THEORY OF NURSING HONEBEHAVIOR
A. Assumptions and Notation
Nursing homes face "private pay" and Medicaid demand. "Private pay"
demand is given by X(P,Q), where X is the number of "private pay" patients,
P is the price charged "private pay" patients, and U is average quality.
"Private pay" demand is increasing in 0, decreasing in P, and marginal
"private pay" revenue is non—decreasing in quality. In contrast, Medicaid
demand is perfectly elastic at the Medicaid reimbursement rate.
CON imposes a capacity constraint on each home. Since there is excess
Medicaid demand, the constraint is binding. It is specified as
(1) X+M =
whereM is the number of Medicaid patients andis the CON allowed capacity.4
Nursing horne arerequiredto provide all patients with the same level of
quality. Therefore, a nursing home's cost function can be specified as a
function of the total number of patients receiving care and average quality.
Let the cost function for providing quality level 0 topatients oe given y
C(,Qi. it is assumed to be increasing and convex1 the marginal cost of caring
for another patient increasing in quality.
Finally, Medicaid reimburses a nursing home its average cost plus r, the
Medicaid "plus factor. Hence, the Medicaid reimbursement per patient is
(2) P r +C(,Q)/.
.ProprietaryNursing Home Behavior
1. Equflibriuln
Homes choose "private pay" price ana quality so as to maximize profits
subject to trieCONcapacity constraint, the profit function is
(3) Ii =Px(P,0)+ — X(P,Q)—C(,Q).
The first order conditions are
(4) PXp +X=
(5) PX = + PXQ.
"Private pay' price is chosen in (4) such that marginal "private pay" revenue
equals the opportunity cost of Medicaid revenue, and quality is chosen in (5)
such that marginal "private pay" revenue equals the marginal cost ot quality
plus the opportunity cost of Medicaid revenue. Since the cost of caring for
Medicaid patients is recovered via Medicaid reimbursement, the marginal cost
of quality is weighted by the proportion of "private pay" patients.
2. Policy Comparative Statics
a. The Medicaid Plus Factor
An increase in the Medicaid "plus" factor causes nursing homes to lower
quality, has an amoiguous effect or "private pay" price, and causes homes to
increase their number of Medicaid patients at the expense of fewer "private
pay" patients. The rationale behind this result is that an increase in r
raises marginal Medicaid revenue, making Medicaid patients more profitable.
Therefore, since the CON capacity constraint is binding, homes want to5
substitute Medicaid patieflts for private pay" patients. Homes can reCuce
private pay demano by increasng their "private pay' price and bylowering
their quality. They surely lower quality, since that also reduces their
operating costs. From (4), given quality, "private pay" price is increasing in
R. Therefore, "private pay" price rises or falls depending on the effect of r
on P. From (2), the increase in r has a positive direct effect on P., and a
negative indirect effect via the reduction in average cost from the fall in
quality. The fall in quality also lowers "private pay" marginal revenue.
Therefore, from (4), "private pay" price rises (falls) if "private pay"
marginal revenue falls more (less) than the net fall in P.
b.TheCON Capacity Constraint
An increase in capacity creates the incentive for proprietary nursing
homes to reduce quality, and has an ambiguous effect on "private pay" price.
An increase in capacity raises the marginal cost of quality. Consequently,
marginal "private pay" revenue becomes greater than the marginal cost of
quality p1us the opportunity cost of Meciicaid revenue in (5). In response,
nursing homes reduce quality. Again, "private pay" price rises or falls
depending on the effect on P. The increase in capacity affects R through
average cost. It has a positive direct effect on average cost, and a negative
indirect effect via the fall in quality. Further, the fall in quality reduces
marginal "private pay" revenue. Therefore, from (4), "private pay" price rises
(falls) if "private pay" marginal revenue falls more (less) than P.
c, CON Entry policy
Entry increases competition for "private pay" patients, and thus reduces
"private pay" demand and marginal revenue to each nursing home. In response,
homes lower quality. The rise in quality increases both 'private pay" marginal
revenue and R, Hence, "private pay" price rises (falls) if marginal "private
pay" revenue rises less (more) than the rise in P.
C. Not For Prof itTM Nursing HomeBehavior
1. Objectives
Unlike proprietary nursing homes, the objectives of "not for profit"
homes are not well defined. Economists typically model "not for profit" firms
as utility maximizers.7 The arguments of a "not for profit' firm's utility
function are debatable and depend upon the institutional setting. in the
nursing home industry, where the religious institution dominates, we assume6
that not for profit homes are basically altruistic in nature. Therefore, we
expect these homes to be concerned with quality, and with providing care to
the poor. Hence, the not for profit' nursing home's utility function is
assumea to be an increasing function of quality and the number of Medicala
patients. "Not for profit' nursing homes are assumed to choose "private pay"
price and quality so as to maximize utility subject to the CON capacity
constraint and subject to a break even constraint.8
2. Equilibriti
Let G(O,M) be the nursing home's utility function, and X the Lagrange
multiplier on the break even constraint. Then, assuming that the Kuhn—Tucker






(7) PX (1/.J(G0 —GMXQ)
=(X/)C0
+PX0.
'Private pay" price is chosen in (6) such that marginal "private pay' revenue
plus the marginal utility of Medicaid patients equals the opportunity cost of
Medicaia revenue, and quality is chosen in (7) such that the marginal "private
pay" revenue plus the marginal utility of quality equals the marginal cost of
quality and marginal opportunity cost of Medicaid revenue.
3. Policy Comparative Statics
Aajustments in the policy variables affect the "not for profit" nursing
home's first order conditions in exactly the same way as they affected the
proprietary first order conditions. Therefore, the directions of "not for
profit" nursing homes responses to policy changes is the same as proprietary
nursing homes responses, but magnitudes of response may differ.
IV. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ECONOMETRIC METHODS
Here, we present methodology for empirically investigating the impact of
Medicaid and CON policy on quality, "private pay" price, and patient mix via
estimation of the reduced form. Except for the quality equation, estimation of
the reduced form is straightforward. Since quality is not directly observed,
the reduced form quality equation cannot be directly estimated. Instead, we
specify a model in which quality is a latent variable but the parameters of
the reduced form quality equation are identified.7
A. THE REDUCED FORM
The reduced form assumes a linear solution to the euiuibrium conditions.
It specifies the endogenous variables to oe linear functions of exogenous
supply and demand vriabIes, and of Medicaid and CON policy variables. Let the








(11) P1 =+ Tz13j2ij+=13,J+kWij
+
(12) =4O+ + Ik=14,J+kWij+E4i,
where the Z1's include exogenous demand variables, the Medicaid plus
factor, and the market concentration level implied by CON policy. The
are exogenous supply variables: input prices, capital stock, and the CON
capacity constraint. Finally, the are unknown parameters, and the
are independently distributed random variables with zero mean.
A binding CON capacity constraint implies several restrictions on the
reduced form. If the constraint is binding, then and M1 sum to for all
1, implying that equations (9) and (10) sum to for all 1. Let be
Then, a binding CON capacity constraint implies
(13) = for j= O,1,...,J,J+2,...,K
(14) $i,i+i
=— 2,J+l'
and a singular covariance matrix. These adding—up restrictions imply that
equation (10) is redunoant. Therefore, we exclude equation (10) from the
estimation. The remaining equations have the same right hand side variables
and no cross equation restrictions, which allows us to efficiently estimate
(9) and (11) by least squares, and then recover the coefficients in (10) from
the restrictions in (13) and (14).8
8. THE REDUCED FORM QUALITY EQUATION
1. A Model of Quality arid Factor Demand
Input demand functions depend on output quantities, input prices, and in
the short run, capital stock. A nursing home's output can be characterized by
the number of patients under its care, and the total amount of quality it
provi'ies all of its patients. Let be nursing home i's total quality level,
and YU be nursing home i's demand for input 2.Supposethe input demand




where the a's are unknown cOeffiCients and the VU'Sarerandom disturbances.
Total quality is just average quality times the total number of patients (i.e.
Therefore, from (12), the reduced form total quality equation is
(16) =4Oi
+ + k=14,J+kWikRi+









(20) = forj 0.
2. Identification and Estimation
The reduced form quality and structural input demand equations are
identified with the imposition of several restrictions on the reduced form
input demand functions. First, quaflty must be normalized to some base. As of
now, it is measured in arbitrary units. If we divide quality by the
coefficient on quality in one of the input demand equations, then quality is
measured in the same units as that input. This is equivalent to restricting9
oneof the a'stounity. Second, tne intercept of the reduceO form quality
equation is iOentified by excluaing from one of the input demand functions.
Triisassumptionrequires one of the input demands to depend only on total
quality and not the mix of quality and number of patients. Finally, there are
the cross equation restrictions implied by (19) and (20), which require the
reduced form input demand equations to be proportional to one another in the
coefficients on the exogenous variables in (16).
The reduced form quality and structural input demand equations are
estimated jointly using a minimum distance procedure described in Chamberlain
(1982). Chamberlain shows that this procedure consistently and efficeintly
estimates a system of equations with nonlinear cross—equation restrictions and
general heteroskedasticity, and derives statistics for hypothesis testinQ.
3. Prediction and Inference
This model can be interpreted as a MIMIC mooel, with filtered input
demands as indicators. The input demands are filtered to remove variation due
to input prices, total number of patients, and capital stock. The remaining
variation is due to quality and random disturbances. Therefore, the indicators
and quality have the same covariation with the explanatory variables, but are
measured in different units. The normalization bases quality, the latent
variable) to the same scale as one of the indicators, and the proportionality
constraints restrict the measurement model of quality to be a one—tactor
model .Themodel can be thought of as a multivariate regression of the
filtered input demands against the explanatory variables with the right hana
sides being proportional to one another.
Since the intercept is identified, an index of quality can be predicted
for each home. These are indicies of input quantities which have been
normalized to account for differences in input prices, total number of
patients, and capital stock. Therefore, they measure the volume or intensity
of services nursing homes provide their patients.
These measures of service intensity allow us to make inferences about
quality. A nursing home's quality is utility patients derive from consuming
its package of goods and services. A home can improve its quality by adjusting
the composition of its package so as to be more in accordance with patients'
preferences or by increasing the quantity of any commodity. Therefore, if
patients prefer nursing services to social activities, the home can improve
its quality without raising its operating costs by shifting resources from
from social activities to nursing services.10
Proprietary homes choose the quantity of each component to maximize
profits. The more 'private pay patients are willing to pay for a particular
component and the lower its marginal cost, the greater the equiliDrium
quantity of that component. If there is an exogenous increase in "private pay"
patient demand, then the home invests in those components that yield the
greatest marginal profit. Therefore, holding input prices constant, increases
in service intensity raise patient utility. Since quality is the utility
patients derive from consuming a nursing home's package, observea increases in
a home's service intensity are tantamount to increases in quality. Hence, the
estimated coefficients on the policy variables in (12) can be interpreted as
partial effects on quality.
A similar argument car be posed for "not for profit" nursing homes. "Not
for profit" nursing homes are characterized as maximizing utility subject to a
breaK even constraint. Since the majority of "not for profit' nursing homes
are operatea by religious organizations, a major argument of their utility
functions is likely to oe quality of care. Therefore, one would expect 'not
for profit" homes to construct their package of goods argo services in
accordance with the preferences of their patients. Consequently, ooserveo
increases in a "not for profit" nursing home's service intensity are also
tantamount to an increases in quality.
V. DATA
The data are constructed from New York State's 1980 survey of Long Term
Care Facilities. The sample consists of 455 nursing homes chosen from 798
possible cases. Excluded were government homes, hospital attached homes, and
non—reporting homes. In the sample are 288 proprietary arid 167 "not for
profit' nursing homes. Unless otherwise specified, the variables are daily
averages, with the unit of observation being the nursing home. Descriptive
statistics are presented in table 1.
In the reduced form, the dependent variables are "private pay" price, the
number of Medicaid patients, and the number of private pay patients. The
dependent variables in the input demand equations are 100's nursing labor
hours, 100's of other labor hours, aria a supplies quantity index.9
The exogenous supply variables are the input prices and capital stock.
The input prices are the hourly nursing wage rate, the hourly other labor wage
rate, and a supplies price index. Since, the majority of capital owned by a
nursing home is the facility itself, capital stock is measured as total area
of the facility in 100,000's of square feet.11
The exogenous demand variables are the per capita income of the people
living in the nursing home's market area, the population over age 65 in the
nursing home's market area, the proportion of "private pay patients in the
nursing home whose last residence before entering the nursing home was located
in the same county in which the nursing home is located, and an index of
health status of the patients in the nursing home. Income is measured in
1000's of dollars, and population in 10,000's of people. The income and
population data come from the 1980 census. The proportion of 'private pay'
patients from the same county is a measure of the distance of the nursing rome
from the family and friends of its patients. Presumably, nursing homes that
are located closer to its patients' family and friends are more attractive,
ceteris paribus. The health index Is really an index of ill—health.1°
Since nursing homes compete only for "private pay" patients the
appropriate market to analyze is the "private pay'patient market. Each home's
geographic "private pay" patient market is somewhat complicated to measure
since the data is reporte on a county basis. The problem is that a nursing
home's market may not be completely commensurate with the county in which it
is located. In particular, homes that are located on county borders certainly
compete for 'private pay patients from both counties. Instead, separate
market areas are defined for each nursing home based on 'private pay' patient
census data. For each home, the survey reports the number of 'private pay"
patients from each county in New York State currently residing jr the home.
Homes participate in several county private pay patient markets. A home's
participation in a county market is given by the proportion of the home's
"private pay" patients from that county. Thus, a home's market area is defined
as the counties in which its "private pay' patients last resided. and the
proportion of its "private pay" patients from each county. This market
definition guides the computation of the market variables.11
The policy variables are the Medicaid plus factor, the CON capacity
constraint, and the concentration of the home's "private pay" patient market
area. New York computes the plus factors based on owner's equity in the
facility. Therefore, there is cross—sectional variation in the Medicaid plus
factor. The CON capacity constraint is measured as the average daily census of
patients in the home, and CON entry policy is captured by a Herfindahi index
of the concentration of each home's "private pay" market.12 Entry reduces the
concentration of a home's "private pay" patient market.12
VI. RESULTS
The models developed in section III were estimated separately for the
proprietary and not for profit" samples. The estimated proprietary reduced
form equations are reportea in table 6, the "not for profit" reduced form is
reported in table 7, ana the structural input demand equations are reported in
tables 8 and 9. The estimates are quite reasonable. As expected, hypothesis
tests, reported in section A, uniformily reject pooling the proprietary and
"not for profit samples, and accpet the restrcitions that identify the
reducea form quality equation. In additon, the coefficients on the the policy
variables are consistant with theory, and the signs on other independent
variables such as own price in the input demand equations are generally as one
woulo expect. The policy results are discu5se in detail in section B; and
are summarized in taDles 2 through 5.
A. Pooling and Specification Tests
We begin by testing the hypothesis that the proprietary and "not for
profit" samples can be pooled in the reduced form "private pay" price and
"private pay patients equations. The test statistics are 4,03 and 2.66,
respectively, and are distributed F(12,431). The carresponing critical value
at the .05 significance level is 1.77. Consequently, we reject pooling.
Before testing to see if the proprietary and "not for profit" reduced
form quality and structural input demand equations can be pooled, we test to
see if restrictions discussed in the identification section are valid. The
test statistics are 20.08 for the proprietary sample and 16.68 for the "not
for profit" sample, and are distributed x2(27). The corresponding critical
value at the .05 significance level is 40.11. Consequently, we accept the
hypothesis that the restrictions are valid. Under the assumption that the
restrictions are valid, we test the hypothesis that the proprietary and "not
for profit samples can be pooled for the reduced form quality and structural
input demand equations. That test statistic is 99.74, and is also distributed
x2(27). Consequently, we reject pooling.13
B. Comparative Statics
1. The Medicaid Pius Factor
The tneoretical moaei predicts that an increase in the Medicaid "plus'
factor causes nursing homes to reduce quaHty, adjust patient mix in favor of
more Medicaid patients at the expense of 'private pay' patients, and has an
ambiguous effect on private pay" price. As can be seen in table 2, these
predictions are confirmed by the empirical results. The coefficients on the
Medicaid "plus factor in the both the proprietary and 'not for profit"
quality equations are indeed negative and significantly different from zero.
Further, the coefficients are negative in both the proprietary and not for
profit" 'private pay' patients equations, and are positive in the Medicaid
patients equations (they are significantly different from zero in the
proprietary reduced form, but insignificant in the "not for profit reduced
form). In addition, the coefficient is positive, but not significant, in the
propietary private pay' price equation, and is negative and significantly
different form zero in the "not for profit" "private pay" price equation.
In summary, these results imply that an increase in the Medicaid 'plus'
tactor causes proprietary nursing homes to reduce quality, possiDly increase
"private pay price, and adjust patient mix in favor of more Medicaia
patients. Furthermore, "not for profit" homes reduce quality and "private pay"
price, and possibly adjust patient mix in favor of more Medicaid patients.
In order to gauge the magnitude of these effects, we compare predicted
equilibria for small, medium, and large differences in the Medicaid "plus"
factor. Table 3 reports predictions of the endogenous variables at the mean of
the data, and for nursing homes whose Medicaid "pius" factor is five dollars,
ten dollars, and fifteen dollars greater than the mean, respectively. These
differences are observed within the sample, as the stanaard deviation of the
Medicaid "plus factor is 15.21. Deviations from the mean are also reporteci.
Consider the differences in quality for proprietary homes. The "mean"
home provides 2.27 units of quality per patient, the "mean plus five" home
produces 2.22 units, the "mean plus ten" home produces 2.17 units, and the
"mean plus fifteen" home produces 2,12 units. To get a more interpretable
measure of the magnitude of the quality differences, we translate these values
into a home's total expenditures on goods and services provided to patients.
In 1980, the average proprietary home total expenditure (variable costs) on
goods and services provided to patients was 2,009 thousand dollars. Therefore,
the average cost per unit quality was 885 thousand dollars. Assuming a
constant marginal cost of quality we can extrapolate total expenditures for14
the other homes: The "mean plus five home provides 44 thousand dollars less
in goods and services than the "mean' home, the "mean plus ten' home provides
89 thousand dollars less, aria the "mean plus fifteen" home provides 133
thousand dollars less.
The "not for profit' quality differences are even larger. The "mean"
home provides 2.77 units of quality per patient, the 'mean plus five" home
provides 2.70 units, the 'mean plus ten" home provides 2.63 units, and the
'mean plus fifteen" homes provides 2.56 units. Average total expenditures of
'not for profit' homes over the sample perioa were 2,432thousanddollars, and
therefore, the average cost per unit quality was 878 thousand dollars.
Assuming a constant marginal cost of quality, the "mean plus five" home
provides 61 thousand dollars less in goods and services than the "mean' home,
the "mean plus ten" home provides 123 thousand dollars less, and the "mean
plus fifteen" home provides 184 thousand dollars less.
Not surprisingly, there is almost no difference in the proprietary
'private pay" prices. On the other hand, the "not for profit" prices show
substantial differences; The "mean plus five" home charges "private pay"
patients 5% less than the "mean" home, the 'mean plus ten" home charges 10%
less, and the 'mean plus fifteen" homes charges 15% less.
Finally, consider the differences in patient mix as represented by the
ratio of the number of Medicaid to "private pay" patients. For proprietary
homes, the "mean plus five" home has a ratio 137. higher than the mean home,
the "mean plus ten" home has a ratio 307. higher, and the "mean plus fifteen"
home has a ratio 50'!. higher. For "not for profit" homes, the "mean plus five"
home has a ratio 87. higher than the "mean" home, the "mean plus ten" home has
a ratio 16% higher, and the "mean plus fifteen" home has a ratio 26% higher.
2. The CON Capacity Constraint
Theory predicts that an increase in capacity causes nursing homes to
lower quality, and has an indeterminate effect on "private pay" price and
patient mix. Again, the empirical results are consistent with the theoretical
predictions. Since the CON capacity constraint is binding, the effect of
constraint is capturea by. the "total number of patients" variable, The
coefficient on this variable is negative and significantly different from zero
in the proprietary quality equation, and negative but insignificant in the
"not for profit' quality equation. It is positive in the proprietary "private
pay" price equation, is negative in the "not for profit" "private pay" price
equation, and insignificant in both. In addition, the coefficient is positive15
and significantly aifferent from zero in proprietary private pay' patients
anu Medicaid patients equations, is positive and significant in the 'not for
profit Medicaid patients equation, and is negative but insignificant in the
'not for profit" "private pay' patients equation.
In summary, additional capacity causes proprietary homes to provide lower
quality, possibly charge higher 'private pay" prices, and fill approximately
ten percent of new capacity with "private pay" patients and ninety percent
with Medicaid patients. 'Not for profit" nursing homes may provide lower
quality, may charge lower "private pay" prices, and fill 100 per cent of new
capacity with Medicaid patients.
We gauge the magnitude of these effects by comparing predictions of the
endogenous variables at the mean ot the data to small, medium, ana large
differences in capacity. Table 4 reports predictions at the mean of the oata,
at the mean plus 25 patients, at the mean pius 50 patients, and at the mean
plus 75 patients. Again these differences are observed in the sample, as the
standard deviation of the "total number of patients" variable is 94.04.
Deviations from the mean are also reported beneath the predicted value.
Consider the differences in quality. The 'mean' proprietary home provides
2.27 units of quality per patient, the "mean plus 25' home provides 2.25
units, the "mean plus 50" home provides 2.23 units, and the "mean plus 75"
nome provides 2.21 units. Translating these differences into total
expenditures on goods and services, we find that the "mean plus 25" home
provides 17 thousand dollars less in goods and services than the "mean" home,
the "mean plus 50" home provides 34 thousand dollars less, and the "mean plus
75" home provides 51 thousand dollars less. Turning to "not for profit" homes,
the "mean" borne provides 2,77 units of quality, the "mean plus 25" home
provides 2,74 units, the "mean plus 50" home provides 2.70 units, and the
"mean plus 75" provides 2.62 units. In terms of expenditures on goods and
services the "mean plus 25" home provides 30 thousand dollars less than the
mean home, the "mean plus 50" home provides 60 thousand dollars less, and the
"mean plus 75" home provides 90 thousand dollars less.
Homes of all sizes charge the same "private pay" prices, but larger homes
have higher Medicaid to "private pay" patient ratios. In the proprietary case,
the "mean plus 25" home has a ratio 13% higher than the "mean" home, the "mean
plus 50" home has a ratio 25% higher, and the "mean plus 75" home has a ratio
35% higher. In the not for profit" case, the "mean plus 25' home has a ratio
27% higher than the 'mean" home, the "mean plus 50" home has a ratio 557,
higher, and the "mean plus 75" home has a ratio 84% higher.16
3. Entry
Entry into the market reduces the market's concentration. Hence, CON
entry policy can be analyzed by looking at the coefficients on the market
concentration index. Theory predicts that an increase In concentration causes
nursing homes to lower quality, and has an indeterminate effect on private
pay" price and patient mix. The empirical results in the proprietary model are
consistent with theory. In the proprietary reduced form, the coefficients on
the market concentration index are negative and significantly different from
zero in trte quality, "private pay" price, and "private pay" patients
equations, ana is positive and significant in the proprietary Medicaid
patients equation. Hence, entry causes proprietary home to raise quality,
raise "private pay" prices, and to substitute Medicaid for "private pay"
patients.
On the otrer hand, all the coefficients on the concentration index in tfle
'not for profit' reduced form equations are positive and not significantly
different from zero. Alternatively, it may be the case that potential "not for
profit patients do not view proprietary and "not for profit" nursing homes
care as close substitutes. This would suggest that proprietary and "not for
profit" nursing homes do not compete in the same markets even if they are
located geographically close to one another. Hence, a joint index of
concentration heavily weighted towards the proprietary homes market would be
relevant for proprietary endogenous variables, but not for the 'not for
profit" homes.
Again, we gauge the magnitude of these effects for proprietary homes by
comparing predictions of the endogenous variables at the mean of the data to
predictions for small, medium, and large differences in market concentration.
Table 5 reports the predictions at the mean concentration level, at the mean
plus .01, at the plus .05, and at the mean plus .1. As usual, these
differences are observed wihin the sample. The "mean plus .01" home provides
10 thousand dollars less in goods and services than then "mean" home, the
"mean plus .05" home provides 52 thousand dollars less, and the "mean plus .1"
home provides 105 thousand dollars less. On the other hand, Increases in
concentration appear to have little effect on "private pay" price and patient
mix.17
Vii. CONCLUSIONS
Health care regulators are concerned with assuring a high standard of
quality, providing the poor with access to care, and controling the expansion
of the industry. With these goals in mind, this paper has analyzed effect of
Medicaic and CON policy on proprietary and not for profit nursing home
behavior.
We find that Medicaid policy makers are faced with a quality—access
trade—off. Specifically, nursing homes whose Medicaid reimbursement rates
include higher Medicaid 'plus' factors care for more Medicaid patients, but
provide lower quality. The empirical work suggests that homes with high 'plus'
factors provide SuDstanti&lly lower quality than homes with mean 'plus
factors. These quality differences when translated into nursing home
expenditures on goods ana services provided patients are observed to be in the
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Further, high "plus" factor homes have
Medicaid to private pay patient ratios possibly 5O higher than mean "plus
factor homes.
We also find that CON policy makers must trade off containing the size of
the industry (and therefore total Meaicaid payments) against auallty aria
access. Specifically, we find that the capacity constraints and the reducec
competition from the entry barriers lead to lower quality and fewer Medicaid
patients receiving care.
Finally, we observe differences in proprietary and 'not for profit'
responses to regulatory policy. Both types of homes adjust quality and patient
mix in the same direction, but in different magnitudes. "Not for profit" homes
tend to have larger quality responses. On the other hano, they have opposite
"private pay" price responses.FOOT4OTES
See these papers tor proofs of theoretical results in this paper.
2 mis representation of a firms output is similar to general models analyzed
in Spence (1975), Sheshinski (1976), and Leffler (1982), and to nursing home
models analyzea in Bishop (1980) and Palmer and Vogel (1983).
See Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) for a discussion of MIMIC models, ano
Aigrer et. al. (1984) for a general survey of latent variable models.
The source of statistics referenced in this section is The U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services' publication, Health, United States 1980.
The CON review boards are not just rubber stamps, Indeed, there is some
casual evidence in support of binding CON capacity and entry constraints.
First, most nursing homes operate above 907. capacity. Second, there is a long
listof individuals inhospitalswaitingfornursinghomeopenings. Finally,
States such New York have imposed moratoriums on nursing home expansion.
6 Scanlon tests and accepts the hypothesis that there is excess MeicaiO
patient demand for nursing home care. This is consistent with the facts cited
in footnote 5.
For example see Hansmann (1981), Newhouse (1970), and Pauly and Redisch
(1973)
8 There are several alternatives to modeling "not for profit nursing homes
in this fashion. Some not for profit homes could be profit maximizers who
have optained "notfor profit legal status in order to take advantage of the
tax breaks. In this case, profits are taken in the form of salary and rent.
Other non—altruist not for profit" homes, could be operated by non—owner
managers who are personal utility maximizers. These managers may manipulate
the operation of the home so as to maximize their own income, prestige, and
security. The result is an inefficient employment of resources. Hence, these
homes are not cost minimizers. This case is discussed in Frech and Ginsburg
(1980). The altruism assumption suggests cost minimization.
The supplies quantity index is calculated as the total expenditures or
supplies divided by an index of the price of supplies. The supplies price
index is a weighted average of the prices of the commodities that constitute
nursing home supplies. These commodities are drugs, other medical supplies,
food, energy, and other supplies. The prices of these commodities are national
price indices in 1977 dollars, and are reported in the Department of Health
and Human Services report, HEALTH CARE FINANCING TRENDS, 1980. The weights are
the proportion of a home's total supplies expenditures accounted for by the
particular commodity.19
10 The health status index is computed from disability scores assignec
patients. The disabilty level of each patient in eight functional areas is
reported in the survey. The disabilty level in each functional area taKes on
one of three values: self care, partial care, and total care. The functional
areas are walking, transferring, wheeling, eating, toileting, bathing,
dressing, and breathing. Walking, transferring, and wheeling were treatea as
mutually exclusive categories. Each home reports the number of patients in
each cell, where a cell is defined by functional area and disability level.
The cells are then aggregated by disability level. After that, the self care
aggregate is multiplied by zero, the partial help aggregate by seven, and the
total help aggregate by fourteen. The scores are then summed and dividea by
the total number of patients times 100. The result is an index of the average
ill—health of the patients in a facility. This index is used for the purposes
of quality control (see Ullmann (1983)).
For each home, the market population is computed as a weighted sum of the
number of persons over age 65 in each county, using the homes proportions of
private patients from the counties as weights. Similar1y, the per capita
income of the population in a home's market area is computed as the weighted
sum of the counties' per capita incomes, using the same weights.
12 Since eachcounty is treated as a separate market, and each home
participates in several county markets, the concentration of a home's private
pay patient market depends upon its degree of participation in the various
county markets. Therefore, the concentration level of a home's private pay
patient market is a weighted sum of the county market concentration levels,
using the home's proportion of private pay patients from each county as
weights. The concentration of a county private pay patient market is computed
using a Herfindahl index, which is based on each home's share (proportion) of
a county's private pay patients. Specifically, it is the sum of squared
shares (see Scherer (1980) pp. 58). Entry reduces the value of this index.20
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5. Other Labor 216.18
Hours (176.39)
6. Supplies Quantity 2.50
Index (2.04)
7. Nursing Hourly 7.82
Wage (2.75)






11. Per Capita 7.15
Income (1.40)
12. Population 1.07
Over 65 ( .88)
13. Z Patients .74
Same County (.26)
14. Health 1.43
Status Index ( .61)












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































COMPARATiVE STATICSTHE MEDICAID "PLUS FACTOR
PROPRIETARY HOMES





QUALITY 2.77 2.70 2.63
INDEX —2.537. —5.057.
TOTAL $2,432 $2,371 $2,309
EXPENDITURES* —$61 —$123
PRIVATE PAY $59.86 $56.89 $53.92
PRICE —4.96% —9.92%
PATIENT 4.80 5.17 5.58
MIX RATIO +7.59% +15.207.
PRIVATE PAY 21.40 20.14 18.87
PATIENTS —5.91% —11.82%
MEDICAID 102.81 104.08 105.34
PATIENTS +1.20% +2.467.


































































































STATICS -THECON CAPACITY CONSTRAINT
PROPRIETARY HOMES
MEAN MEAN +25 MEAN -f50 MEAN +75
TOTAL # OF 124.61 124.61 149.61 199.61
PATIENTS ÷20.067. +60.197. +60.197.
QUALITY 2.27 2.25 2.23 2.21
INDEX —0.857. —1.707. -2.547.
TOTAL $2,009 $1,992 $1,975 $1,958
EXPENDITURES* —$17 —$34 -$51
PRIVATE PAY $59.89 $60.19 $60.49 $60.79
PRICE +0.507. +1.007. +1.507.
PATiENT 3.90 4.42 4.87 5.26
MIX RATIO +13.387. +24.867. +34.797.
PRIVATE PAY 25.44 27.59 29.74 31.89
PATIENTS +8.457. +16.907. +25.357.
MEDICAID 99.17 122.00 144.82 167.65






MEAN +50 MEAN +75










































































































































ESTIMATED COEFFiCIENTS AND T—STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES
INDEPENDENT PRIVATE PAY AVERAGE "PRIVATE PAY'
VARIABLE PRICE QUALITY PATIENTS
1. CONSTANT 89.22 .51 22.68
2.06) C.36) C.46)
2. TOTAL # OF .01 -.08 .09
PATIENTS ( 1.12) ( 1.52) C 6.87)
3. NURSING HOURLY 2.11 —.14 —3.57
WAGE C 2.31) ( 3.03) ( 3.44)
4. OTHER LABOR'S 1.48 .04 .75
HOURLY WAGE ( 1.51) C.86) (.68)
5. SUPPLIES —41.73 .58 —7.07
PRICE ( 1.35) (.56) (.20)
6. CAPITAL .04 .02 .02
STOCK C 1.65) ( 1.70) C.65)
7. HEALTH 7.69 1.27 3.25
STATUS C 4.48) (29.98) ( 1.66)
8. INCOME .40 .04 3.33
.57) C 3.00) C 4.21)
9. POPULATION —4.23 -.04 -3.32
2.51) C 4.01) C 1.91)
10. MEDICAID PLUS .05 -.01 -.49
FACTOR C.20) ( 2.11) C1.96)
11. PATIENTS —12.51 .19 6.95
SAME COUNTY C 3.45) C 2.21) ( 1.69)
12. MARKET —18.61 —1.18 —33.22
CONCENTRATION ( 1.88) ( 4.12) ( 2.96)
13. R—SQUARED .39 .9728
TABLE 7
NOT FOR PROFIT REDUCED FORM
ESTIMATED COEFFiCIENTS AND 1—STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES
INDEPENDENT PRIVATE PAY" AVERAGE "PRIVATE PAY'
VARIABLE PRICE QUALITY PATIENTS
1. CONSTANT 18.81 .21 69.94
.92) (.26) ( 3.04)
2. TOTAL # OF -.01 —.14 —.01
PATIENTS (.42) ( 1.14) C.43)
3. NURSING HOURLY 1.04 .06 —.83
WAGE (.84) (.81) C.60)
4. OTHER LABOR'S .67 —.18 —1.02
HOURLY WAGE (.61) ( 2.98) (.84)
5. SUPPLIES —5.33 .69 —29.55
PRICE C.42) C 1.38) C 2.06)
6. CAPITAL 1.21 .04 2.57
STOCK C 2.10) ( 1.88) ( 3.98)
7. HEALTH 15.49 1.82 —8.96
STATUS ( 6.65) (23.30) C 3.44)
8. INCOME .87 .06 1.57
.73) ( 1.96) ( 1.17)
9. POPULATION 4.59 -.05 —7.09
C 1.71) C.66) C 2.35)
10. MEDICAID PLUS —.59 -.01 —.25
FACTOR ( 2.62) C 2.13) C 1.00)
11. PATIENTS —6.43 .29 12.56
SAME COUNTY C 1.38) C 2.05) ( 2.41)
12. MARKET 19,29 .14 33.90
CONCENTRATION (.84) C.21) ( 1.32)
13. P—SQUARED .48 .9729
TABLE 8
PROPRIETARY INPUT DEMAND EQUATiONS
INDEPENDENT VARiABLE NURSING HOURS OTHER LABOR HOURS SUPPLIES-
1. CONSTANT 3.39 —2.92 16.38
1.37) ( 2,78) ( 6.12)
2. TOTAL QUALITY 1.00* .24 .04
(12.41) (.75)
3. TOTAL # OF .OO .86 2.04
PATIENTS (16.38) (12.76)
4. NURSING HOURLY .02 .00 .14
WAGE (.44) (.31) ( 2.90)
5. OTHER LABOR'S -.05 —.10 —.11
HOURLY WAGE C.91) C 3.95) C 1.92)
6. SUPPLIES —2.20 —12.01
PRiCE C 1.22) C 3.45) C 6.14)
7. CAPITAL —.03 —.04 —.00
STOCK C 1.72) C 9.47) (.60)
TABLE 9
'NOT FOR PROFIT" INPUT DEMAND EQUATIONS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE NURSING HOURS OTHER LABOR HOURS SUPPLIES
1. CONSTANT .21 —1.85 6.61
.26) ( 2.87) ( 9.46)
2. TOTAL QUALITY 1.00 .26 .08
7.77) ( 2.00)
3. TOTAL # OF .O0 1.21 1.62
PATIENTS ( 7,61) C 8.89)
4. NURSING HOURLY —.17 .07 .01
WAGE C 2.75) C 1.92) (.21)
5. OTHER LABOR'S .18 —.06 .07
HOURLY WAGE ( 2.99) C 1.86) C 1.89)
6. SUPPLIES —.83 —.04 —4.91
PRICE ( 1,08) C 2.76) ( 9.08)
7. CAPITAL .00 .03 -.01
STOCK (.08) ( 1.19) (.48)
*Coefficientrestricted to unity.
**Coefficientrestrictea to zero.